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You and I know enough to know it’s warm 
Compared with cold, and cold compared with 
warm. 
But all the fun’s in how you say a thing. 
 
—— Robert Frost, “The Mountain” 
 
I. 
The question of style in rhetoric has always been associated with clarity and 
intelligibility, signifying different modes of expression that can articulate the 
same subject matter in order to be more persuasive. “Proper” style, since 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, has been determined in terms of clarity and dignity of 
expression where clarity is not allowed to become too prosaic nor dignity 
too excessive to deviate from common practice. Good style is thus the well-
known Aristotelian “golden mean” or moderation between two excesses. 
Clarity uncommon enough to astonish and dignity common enough to 
reassure. “Proper words in proper places,” to use Jonathan Swift, a 
rhetorician of another kind, would be the definition of good style or proper 
lexis for proper topos, which means that style should be appropriate to the 
subject matter. The very fact that it is not in A Modest Proposal is what 
characterizes satire whose rhetorical effect, as Swift was well aware, is 
dependent on the very authority of what it mocks. Good style should thus 
always be proportionate to its subject matter. In this paper, however, I will 
focus on the invasiveness of style, its ability to disable cognition, and the 
fact that style first emerges in the failure of reflexivity between lexis and 
topos, precisely in what, for Aristotle, would be “bad style,” that is to say, in 
the disruption of continuity between rhetoric and narrative content, which 
will be further related to questions of reading, of temporality and politics.   
The incursion of style upon our ability to read, the “coup de style,” 
indeed of stylus, of a pointed object that “might be used in a vicious attack 
against what philosophy appeals to in the name of matter,” as Derrida writes 
in Spurs,1 will in this paper take the form of specific tropological concerns 
that will be given in terms of Paul de Man’s understanding of allegory and 
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reading. Style, inescapably tied to rhetoric and figurativity as a mode of 
expression, will become a syncope of cognition present in every text: a 
disruptive possibility of the text that outmatches its potential to be read. 
Style, seen in these terms, is a certain excess or lack of text that opens to a 
jouissance of reading, the pain of having read always too much or too little, 
of always having read otherwise.  
What the rhetorical structure of reading in de Man points to, as we shall 
see in his reading of Proust, is the radical impossibility of its closure. One 
will never have read enough. By reactivating a certain performance or 
stylization of the origin that the aesthetico-referential programs push into 
latency, rhetoric saves reading from the terror of positivism. Style 
intervenes, in other words, in the reference regimes precisely by recalling the 
allegorical structuring of their authority. Style itself becomes a mise en 
abyme of reference, what uproots the hermeneutic structures often organized 
around the fetishised figures of the literal precisely in order to disappear, like 
a ghostly police state that obliterates the traces of its own inscription. 
“Styling” then could also be seen as an assault on mimetic regimes of 
aesthetic politics, because it points to virtual presents in a bid that saves the 
possibility of imagining alternatives to the world. And the exigency of 
reading is to keep this possibility forever open. 
 
II. 
It is in the errancy of language that all texts initiate, in the very fact that 
something first must be missing for the narrative to begin. But as long as 
there is narrative, there will have been missed contents of narration. 
Allegory, as we shall see, will be the figure that registers this default in the 
narratological economy. There is thus a permanent threat of misreading, 
what we call style, in every reading. One always risks missing the point. If 
“all the fun’s in how you say a thing,” then all the tragedy lies in the 
possibility of misunderstanding what the fun implies. But style is not a 
deficiency of meaning, an “aberration,” to use de Man’s idiom, but rather its 
condition of possibility. To the extent that all language is figurative, all 
language is aberrant. As soon as in the territory of language, in other words, 
one is in the territory of style. Style is the openness in which the fact of 
language takes place. It is what gives it its face. But insofar as it always 
implies multiplicity, it also signifies the possibility of an otherwise, which 
keeps traumatizing closed structures, recalling them to their own 
rescindability. One could say that style is the very trace of rhetoricity in the 
text and a memory of contingency in the system. 
Texts will thus always imply an otherwise or allegoria, literally “other 
speaking,” that devastates reading by reactivating its virtual states. There is 
another text within it, certain latency or unconscious, a voice of another 
pushed back that reading cannot account for––which is why every reading is 
a misreading. A text, in other words, is thus always divided, “there always is 
an infra-text.” It is never singular but always plural––there is not a text but, 
rather, there are always texts.2 Meaning then is radically unstable, subject to 
rescindability, its history is always yet to be read. Far from being nihilistic, 
however, this is nothing other but an affirmation of reading in a Nietzschean 
sense, as the joyous celebration of a world without “sure play,” as Derrida 
puts it, no longer turned towards presence but “without truth, without origin, 
offered to an active interpretation.”3 
In de Man’s terms, this disinscription of meaning, its rescindability, 
“serves the disillusioning function of recalling the substitutive character… 
and the forgotten fictivity of the system.”4 This is why, for de Man, allegory 
will be the exemplary figure of rhetoricity that constitutes all language. It is 
as if in allegory language struggled to free itself from the confines of 
mimeticism that determines positivistic rationality, revealing its true 
condition. Allegory is an index of referential miscarriage constitutive of all 
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language. The differential structure, as we shall see, between meaning and 
reference, is not only not forgotten in allegory, but what figurative language 
masks is disclosed in the very structure of allegory. Allegory registers the 
memory of all figures as masks by tearing them off. It is a permanent 
interruption of the aesthetic closures and an irreducible part of every 
reading. “The allegorical representation of Reading,” de Man writes, is “the 
irreducible component of any text. All that will be represented in such an 
allegory will deflect from the act of reading and BLOCK access to its 
understanding. The allegory of reading narrates the impossibility of reading. 
But this impossibility necessarily extends to the word ‘reading’ which is thus 
deprived of any referential meaning whatsoever.”5 It is the referential flight 
of meaning that the text narrates, its failure to state what it knows, that de 
Man calls allegory. This flight, of course, with a force of primary repression, 
opens all economies of tropological substitutivity, style, iterability and 
desire––it is what in “the work” of reading remains its unappropriable 
condition. 
In his reading of Proust, de Man singles out an episode where young 
Marcel, the narrator of the novel, reflects on the nature of this allegorical 
“blockage.” Charles Swann, a friend of Marcel’s family, a wealthy socialite 
and art connoisseur, who has a keen eye for analogy, comes to visit the 
family at Combray and compares the kitchen maid in Marcel’s household to 
Giotto’s allegorical representation of Charity. But the metaphor, de Man 
writes, “by generalising itself in its own allegory… seems to have displaced 
its proper meaning” (AR, 73). Its meaning has been carried out of the limits 
the power of analogical relation confers: “The kitchen maid resembles 
Giotto’s Charity, but it appears [to Marcel] that the latter’s gesture also 
makes her resemble Françoise,” the uncharitable but dutiful maid in charge 
of the household. “If the image, as a representation, also connotes 
Françoise,” as de Man continues, “it widely misses its mark, for nothing 
could be less charitable than Françoise, especially in her attitude toward the 
kitchen maid (AR, 76). In other words, the figure of the metaphor designates 
the reference of its ground split by two incompatible meanings unable to 
coexist. The passage literally becomes an impasse or an aporia for Marcel. 
However, it is even before this that Proust begins to dramatize the power of 
allegory to destabilise the narrative continuity by placing in question its 
referential status, which opens young Marcel to the anxiety of reference, a 
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certain chronic nervousness of words that, in fact, opens the history of 
reading: “What was more,” says Marcel, the kitchen maid,  
poor girl, fattened by her pregnancy even in her face, even in her cheeks, which 
descended straight and square, rather resembled, in fact, those strong, mannish 
virgins, matrons really, in whom the virtues are personified in the Arena [the 
Arena Chapel in Padua]. And I realise now that those virtues resembled her in 
another way. Just as the image of this girl was increased by the added symbol she 
carried before her belly without appearing to understand its meaning, without 
expressing in her face anything of its beauty and spirit, as a mere heavy burden, 
in the same way the powerful housewife who is represented at the Arena below 
the name ‘Caritas’… embodies this virtue without any thought of charity seeming 
ever to have been capable of being expressed by her vulgar, energetic face.6  
And further down: “Envy, too, might have had more of a particular 
expression of envy” (83). Allegory then narrates precisely the interruption of 
continuity between the sign and its meaning––one that is initially displeasing 
for Marcel, and displeasing because disjunctive, and unaesthetic.7 Both the 
kitchen maid and Charity are allegorical representations of virtue only 
insofar as they are incapable of representing it. What ties them together is 
the unreadability of their own narration. They both express what allegory 
does not narrate; they allegorize, in other words, only the impossibility of 
narration.  
The failure of metaphor here does not create tension but tears its own 
connective tissue apart as soon as it is allegorised: “From the structural and 
rhetorical point of view,” says de Man, “all that matters is that the allegorical 
representation leads towards a meaning that diverges from the initial 
meaning to the point of foreclosing its manifestation” (AR, 75). What is 
foreclosed then is the possibility of reading. Allegoria that haunts the text as 
its undecidability comes here to arrogate the power of conferring meaning 
that it has at the same time displaced. It disassembles the trap of literalism 
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set up by tropological systems and, at least, “states the truth of its 
aberration” (AR, 76)––this, however, as de Man cautions, does not make 
allegory more authentic or epistemologically reliable. Reference of Charity 
that can be as uncharitable as Françoise and that allows of no adjudication of 
meaning becomes, for de Man, the allegorical representation of reading in 
general. Indeed, de Man writes, “a literal reading of Giotto’s fresco would 
never have discovered what it meant, since all the represented properties 
point in a different direction. We know the meaning of the allegory only 
because Giotto… spelled it out on the upper frame of his painting: 
KARITAS. We accede to the proper meaning by a direct act of reading, not 
by the oblique reading of the allegory” (AR, 77, emphasis added). And it is 
this obliqueness—this impossibility of getting it right—inherent in every 
reading, that accounts for the irreducible plurality of styles, or, what 
amounts to the same thing, the impossibility of reading other than otherwise. 
Style, then, could be seen as that which desediments reading by proposing it 
to an always-there of its otherwise.  
If anything, allegory signifies the errancy of what it states. It seems to 
disconnect the narrative pattern, now troubled and nervous, no longer able to 
know what it means. There is a sort of static between the allegorical sign and 
its reference that questions the very possibility of connection. What is in 
question in allegory is the accountability of reference or anteriority. Reading 
a paragraph from de Man’s Allegories of Reading, J. Hillis Miller identifies 
allegory precisely as a figure of unreadability. Allegory, he writes,  
means to say it otherwise in the marketplace, in public, as an esoteric expression 
of an esoteric wisdom. As in the case of parable, for example, the parables of 
Jesus in the Gospels, this is the way of revealing it and not revealing it. If you 
have the key to the allegory, then the esoteric wisdom has been expressed 
(otherwise), but then you would not have needed to have it said otherwise. If you 
do not have the key, then the allegory remains opaque. You are likely to take it 
literally, to think it means just what is says. If you understand it you do not need 
it. If you do not understand it you never will do so from anything on the surface. 
A paradox of unreadability is therefore built into the concept of allegory from the 
beginning.8  
Allegory says it otherwise, in style. It signifies precisely “this Charity 
without charity,” as Marcel reflects in Proust, “this Envy which looked like 
nothing more than a plate in a medical book” or “a Justice whose greyish 
and meanly regular face was the very same which, in Combray, 
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characterised certain petty, pious and unfeeling bourgeois ladies I saw at 
Mass, some of whom had long since been enrolled in the reserve militia of 
Injustice” (Way by Swann’s, 84). There is thus a tropological disturbance of 
substitutive patterns that would stabilise the text. Mirrors are broken, the 
specular tropological structure fissured, pieces do not really coincide as the 
moment of reflexivity is ripped through by a mismatch that makes the part 
larger than the whole that would contain it: the face of Charity goes beyond 
charity it seeks to represent; it is “vulgar, energetic” (83), uncharitable, 
charity defaced. The loss of the specular structure as the condition of all 
cognitive understanding undermines also our capacity to read the text and be 
done with it. Allegory splinters the text or rather makes its splinters blind the 
reader in his attempt to read it—paradoxically however, the reader that fully 
sees is the one that refuses to read. In case of this particular passage from 
Proust, “a single icon engenders two meanings, the one representational and 
literal, the other allegorical and ‘proper,’ and the two meanings,” says de 
Man, “fight each other with the blind power of stupidity” (AR, 76). The 
allegorical, for Marcel, as we have seen, is unwarranted because it reads 
what it does not state; the representational, by reading what it states, reads 
“improperly.” So, fully having read, or thinking one has, is not to have read 
at all. For reading, as de Man writes, is “something else:” 
Everything in this novel signifies something other than what it represents… it is 
always something else that is intended. It can be shown that the most adequate 
term to designate this “something else” is Reading. But one must at the same time 
“understand” that this word bars access, once and forever, to a meaning that yet 
can never cease to call out for its understanding. (AR, 77) 
To read, in other words, is to have misread, to have read in style or 
otherwise, and to have already deserted what one reads. This “otherwise” 
keeps the call for its understanding open. It is also what destines reading to 
history, but one that is shorn of hope that we will ever have read properly, 
ever found the “right” style. Indeed, as long as there is style, the right one 
(we) will be missing. “Referential statements,” as Miller suggests in The 
Ethics of Reading, what would ground the text, “are aberrant not in the sense 
of wandering away from some ascertainable norm, but in the sense of being 
a perpetual wandering from beginning to end… we have no way to measure 
whether or not they are aberrant. All we can know is that they may be in 
error.”9 Although Miller does not say so explicitly, the persistent threat of 
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misreading is also what tears open a space for ethical obligation. There is an 
imperative, what one must do, only against, and indeed in spite of, the 
originary unensurability of its ground. One must precisely insofar as one 
does not have to––this is the force of the imperative that commands only 
against the fundamental unmasterability of what grounds it. Without this 
contingency the imperative would lose the force of its exigency; in its very 
categoricity, in other words, it is shadowed by a possible contingency. 
“There can be an imperative,” Werner Hamacher writes, “only because the 
referential function finds no correspondence in that imperative… Therefore 
every imperative must remain exposed to the question of whether it is not 
merely in the service of contingent authorities and ephemeral experiences.”10 
 
III. 
The unmasterability of reference is also what opens history and the 
possibility of reading, history that is nothing other than the opening to the 
future of reading. The text, as long as there is one, will always have cut itself 
loose from the truth of its reading, although it may carry its remains in the 
odd number of its creases that, unfolded, never really add up. And, as long 
as the text makes reading impossible, as long as there is unreadability that, 
as de Man says, “necessarily extends to the word ‘reading,’” (AR, 77), there 
will have been time for reading. Unreadability that is constitutive of the text 
is what gives us time to read. “As a writer,” says de Man, “Proust is the one 
who knows that the hour of truth, like the hour of death, never arrives on 
time, since what we call time is precisely truth’s inability to coincide with 
itself. A la recherche du temps perdu narrates the flight of meaning, but this 
does not prevent its own meaning from being, incessantly, in flight” (AR, 
78). The allegory of reading becomes the accountant of time that derives 
from the tension between “the referential and the figural semantic fields” 
(AR, 157), which is to say from its rhetoricity. But also and “contrary to 
what one might think, [it is rhetoricity that] enforces the inevitably 
‘political’ nature or, more correctly, the ‘politicality’ (since one could hardly 
speak of ‘nature’ in this case) of all forms of human language…” (156), 
writes de Man. The political, in de Man’s case, is thus made possible by the 
radical allegorization, that is to say, the stylization, of the “natural link” 
constitutive of all language that “is not conceived as a transcendental 
principle” but precisely, he says, as “the possibility of contingent error” 
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(AR, 156). And it is this possibility, hardwired in the very stuff of language, 
that opens the space of the contestability of the social, that I call the 
political. Rhetoric in de Man, considered politically disabling because of its 
obsessive referential attrition, is then––and for precisely the same reason––
rather what opens the possibility of articulating alternatives to the world, 
leading to too much politics rather than lack of it. 
The impossibility of reading and the inability of language to denominate, 
is not derivative but constitutive of all language. Insofar as there is 
something like language, referential indeterminacy remains irreducible. And 
this “unensurability of meaning,” as Hamacher notes, “is not an effect of the 
temporal succession in which the text unfolds, as phenomenological and 
historicist hermeneutic approaches would happily assume, nor is it a 
consequence of the historical distance between the text and its 
understanding. On the contrary, time and history are first opened up by the 
semantic indeterminacy of language” (RDR, 174). In other words, the 
ontological unfolding of presence in its hard, singular, mutilated faces––time 
itself––is scripted in the fabric of language as “the possibility of contingent 
error.” 
Reading that for de Man, as we have seen, always carries the possibility 
of misrecognition is essentially disintegrative and allegory is the figure that 
makes this possibility apparent. In Proust, it is forgetting and dismembrance 
that powers mémoire involontaire as a disturbance that tears open a hole of 
time. Rather than revealing a consistency of integrated consciousness, 
mémoire involontaire reveals the impossibility of self-knowledge: “It is a 
waste of effort,” writes Proust’s narrator, “for us to try to summon it, all the 
exertions of our intelligence are useless. The past is hidden outside the realm 
of our intelligence and beyond its reach, in some material object (in the 
sensation that this material object would give us) which we do not suspect. It 
depends on chance whether we encounter this object before we die, or do not 
encounter it” (Way by Swann’s, 47). Scattered impressions and fragments, 
“ruins” of memory––that strictly speaking is no longer ours but that of the 
other, of another-speaking, of allegoria––are suddenly “unanchored at a 
great depth” (48). Far from being integrative, this means rather that self-
reflexivity is permanently disjunct and uncertain, unfolded only in what 
interrupts self-possession, dependent on chance encounters and random 
occurrences without anything to plot the drama of their appearance. What 
makes us whole in Proust is what reveals us permanently wounded.  
Mémoire involontaire disperses thus the phenomenology of self-
exposition. It operates an allegorical evisceration of identity. It is not a 
technē of anamnesis, a recovery of subjectivity, but precisely a resistance to 
it, what would be an inscription of an “elsewhere” in it, of the other that like 
lightening in sudden bursts interrupts all egology as the history of self-
reflexivity. Such disintegrative moments are also stylistic effractions of the 
illusion of continuity and narrative progression, which accounts for the 
digressive element of Proust’s writing: in search of time that is always, and 
remains, infinitely out of time. Mémoire involontaire, in other words, 
remembers as much as it dismembers––what de Man will say of 
autobiography in general: “[it] deprives and disfigures to the precise extent 
that it restores.”11 It reveals the impossibility of integrated consciousness. In 
its sudden exposures, mémoire involontaire tells that there is a sort of half-
open book to us (a hypogram?) whose lines we have written in a language 
we no longer speak but that permanently speaks and conspires against us. It 
is not the unconscious—that would fit the Freudian paradigm too readily—
but something radically exterior, for the unconscious is still implicated in the 
economy of the ego as a reserve fund for the inadmissible. It is some other 
other that unravels the limits of identity, keeps it wounded permanently, 
prevents it from closing in upon its own in repose or atrophy, that shows 
what can only be the originary impossibility of Narcissus or self-identity.  
It is thus allegory rather than metaphor that is at the heart of Proust’s 
writing. Indeed, Proust’s entire search for lost time could be seen as an 
allegory of the impossibility of integration, of permanent losses and 
mourning.  
Allegory is always an allegory of a tropological stabilisation in the text, a 
“contre” in every text, what in reading as a cognitive process turns against it, 
so to speak. Allegory is both the cause of reading failure and of its 
possibility. It narrates the story of unaccountability of reference or, in de 
Man’s words, “of its own denominational aberration” (AR, 162). It is a 
process of deconstruction that exposes the unwarranted conceptual systems 
that substitute reference for signification in a bid to finally close off the 
textual field. Inability to read keeps this field open; it is the very source of 
reading and its takings. For what is reading if not an allegory of its own 
repetitive failures to read that keeps the text rescindable, open to continual 
retests: the very revenue of reading. For de Man, Avital Ronell writes, 
“[r]eading involves the undoing of interpretative figures to the extent that it 
questions whether any synthesis, any single meaning, can close off a text 
and adequately account for its constitution… [it] ‘states the logic of figures 
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and the logic of narratives to be constantly divergent,’” 12 what one could 
call the very definition of style. But allegory itself is a figure that can “only 
repeat this aberration on various levels of rhetorical complexity” (AR, 162, 
emphasis added). In other words, for de Man, allegory does not escape the 
reappropriative metaphorics of reading.  
Ronell, however, distinguishes between interpretation and reading: “In 
contrast to interpretation,” she writes, “which involves a development over 
the course of a narrative toward a single figure reconciling all it diverse 
moments, ‘reading’ ‘states the logic of figures and the logic of narratives to 
be constantly divergent.’” (Stupidity, 104). This distinction, however, is 
problematic not only because the shades of its edges are impossible to 
delimit––where does reading begin and interpretation end?––but also 
because it annuls, in a stroke, the very premise of de Man’s Aesthetic 
Ideology and the politico-epistemic stakes in reading. It surreptitiously 
postulates the possibility of authentic or correct reading––the end of style, in 
our terms––that somehow precedes interpretative process and regulates the 
field of its displacements, what would be the ad-venture of truth. De Man, 
however, makes no such claim for his reading but, on the contrary, 
repeatedly states the impossibility of any reading, including his own, not to 
forget its rhetorical status.13 Reading cannot not be referential: “All readings 
are in error because they assume their own readability” (AR, 202), but this is 
precisely what opens reading to further deconstruction. Once again, allegory 
does not escape the reappropriative or cognitive metaphorics of reading, but 
this is also why we never will have finished reading. Reading both 
(con)states and performs the undoing its own statement. It “never ceases to 
partake of the very violence against which it is directed,” as de Man writes 
in “Shelley Disfigured.”14 
The allegorical disruption that recalls closed conceptual systems to their 
substitutivity, their originary stylization, the originary prosthesis or 
performance of anteriority, will thus necessarily lead to another 
reappropriation that takes its own undoing as the referential closure. 
Catastrophe of cognition then is only a syncope, a fainting or a loss that gets 
repossessed––but that now leaves visible its originary virtuality. In other 
words, allegory as a trope reiterates the mimetic model that calls for yet 
another reading: “Texts engender texts,” de Man says, “as a result of their 
necessarily aberrant semantic structure; hence the fact that they consist of a 
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series of repetitive reversals…” (AR, 162). Whenever reading stops, it does 
so prematurely. The possibility of referential reading, however, is the 
horizon and the pathogen of every reading, which is why it solicits a call for 
the infinite vigilance of deconstruction that will never have come to rest and 
that, in the end, is committed to what Derrida would call an absolute 
arrivant, for which or “for whom one must leave an empty place.”15 This is 
why de Man can write that “deconstructive discourses are suspiciously text-
productive” (AR, 200). For what deconstruction cannot reach is closure. It 
cannot complete itself because it is owed to the other, which is why it is not 
a system but rather a reading of inevitable misreading inherent to all 
systems. Deconstruction is the rear-guard work of style, what recalls the 
substitutivity of all systems.  
 
IV. 
Style emerges thus in the fissure between sign and meaning, that is to say, in 
unreadability. It is the radical allegorisation of “the natural link,” the 
interruption of continuity between sign and meaning that I propose to call 
style—what shows that sign and meaning can never coincide, e.g., Charity 
represented by “uncharitable” Françoise in Proust or Justice whose face 
becomes “unfeeling” and “unjust.” Style itself is an indication of a lost 
reference of reading. Furthermore, like reading, there is never just only one 
                                                 
15
 The arrivant in Derrida is affirmed as an absolute alterity or wholly other in Levinasian 
terms and his notion of the other as pure transcendence that remains outside 
phenomenology—to greet the other as other, as unassimilable, is to do him justice. 
Absolute arrivant comes also as the unpredictability of the future, as alterity that remains 
radically unforeseeable, without anticipation, as Derrida writes in Spectres of Marx: 
“Awaiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any 
longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in advance to the 
absolute surprise of the arrivant from whom or from which one will not ask anything in 
return and who or which will not be asked to commit to the domestic contracts of any 
welcoming power (family, state, nation, territory, native soil or blood, language, culture 
in general, even humanity), just opening which renounces any right to property, any right 
in general, messianic opening to what is coming, that is, to the event that cannot be 
awaited as such, or recognized in advance therefore, to the event as the foreigner itself, to 
her or to him for whom one must leave an empty place, always, in memory of the 
hope…” Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of 
Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 
1994:81-82). This is what reading is pledged to; it commits all its resources, owes itself 
to the other, to the unwritten accounts of its history—which means that history is never 
past but always yet to be done. For absolute arrivant, cf. also Jacques Derrida, Aporias, 
trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP, 1993:33-35). 
but a plurality of styles. It is only ever in plural. As we have seen, style 
points to an interruption and failure of our ability to read, to a temporary 
swoon or syncope of cognition that shows “the logic of figures and the logic 
of narratives to be constantly divergent.” This would be the idea of stylus as 
a “pointed object” that intervenes, literally punctures the attempt to totalize 
or close off a text. The fissure to which style points is rhetorical and 
manifested in the structure of allegory that preserves the alterity of the text, 
its ultimate unreadability that, however, makes reading itself possible. It is 
here also, in this impotence to read, that the political finds its conditions of 
possibility, because it allows for the contestability of the social, the social 
that is never fully read, that remains incomplete. Style intervenes in the 
reference regimes to show the inscription and the contingent nature of their 
authority. It is tied to politics in that it presupposes the possibility of 
synchronic alternative meanings. And this is what reading is, always 
otherwise, in style. 
As the trace of rhetoricity in the text, style keeps visible the contingency 
of the historical archives and epistemic regimes making possible alternate 
economies of meaning. As a memory of contingency in the system, it frees 
up its repressed energies. This general freeing of latency in the text disrupts 
all possibilities of its totalisation. Unlike other rhetorical figures, allegory, as 
we have seen, is the very expression of style, of its performative 
possibilities. As a figure that registers the inscriptive traces of the system, 
allegory points to a certain originary prosthetics or performance of 
anteriority, the originary styling of the origin.  
Style opens thus to an absence of any unifying principle that would arrest 
the drift of text in peripheral readings, its very ek-stasis. It is affirmative and 
remains complicit, without conscience, with Nietzschean destruction of 
epistemic orders. It is the affirmation of reading as a certain continual 
intoxication of disinscription of meaning, the inability of language to 
synchronize with its object, without thereby being governed by a negative, 
guilty desire for the proper. The proper is style-less. It is the stupor and 
atrophy of style. Style is rather the trauma of this drowsiness. It is 
astonishment itself, and reading shows itself in this traumatism of the same 
by placing it in question, by mortifying it without end. In style, the body and 
matter of the text are lost, dismembered in a dance of active interpretation, 
but they are lost without grandeur: there is nothing to commemorate. Indeed, 
if “all the fun’s in how you say a thing,” as Frost suggests, then we will 
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